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SWISS BANK SECRECY AND THE MARCOS AFFAIR
PIETER J. HOETS* & SARA G. ZWART**
I. AN IDEAL HIDEAWAY
In the small communities deep in the valleys between the majestic,
snow-capped Alps and Jura mountains, respect for an individual's pri-
vacy rights and a belief in individual freedom are firmly rooted and
imbedded in the Swiss character. In fact, in Switzerland, as in other
civil law countries, protection of a person's privacy is deemed legally
fundamental.' Such personal privacy includes the right to protect one's
bank accounts from foreign eyes; therefore, Swiss bank officers and em-
ployees must keep secret the amount and existence of their clients'
bank accounts.' Since Switzerland is also known for its long-standing
neutrality,' stable currency, broad range of financial services, and su-
* Consultant to the law firm of Reid & Priest, New York, NY; Corporate Counsel of
Coca-Cola Europe (ret.); Member of Ohio Bar.
** Assistant Professor of Business Law, Stern School of Business, New York Univer-
sity; Member of New York, Ohio and Utah Bars.
The authors wish to thank Dr. S. Salvioni of Locarno, Switzerland, counsel to the
Philippines in the Marcos case, for reading the manuscript.
1. See, e.g., Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and its Legal Implications in the United
States, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 18, 20-21 (1978). Personality rights also include a person's
physical and intellectual integrity, his liberty of action, his legal capacity and his own
name. Id.; see also Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
2. Honegger, Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and Illumination of the
United States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding, 9 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1,
1-2 (1983). "'Banking secrecy' means that the banks must keep secret any information
about their clients regarding privacy and property, which they receive by practicing their
business. This discretion applies to the banks' officers, employees and any other persons
with a direct relation to the bank." Id.
3. The historical roots of Swiss neutrality can be traced to Swiss internal policy in
the early sixteenth century. W. MARTIN, SwrrZERLAND (1971). Cantons were admitted
into the confederacy only upon a pledge of strict neutrality in the event of disputes
between confederate states. Id. Swiss policy of neutrality toward foreign states was an
exercise in political pragmatism. In 1511, the Swiss opted to appease France and Austria
by staying neutral in their disputes. Id. In 1815, a war-torn continent recognized Swiss
neutrality as an integral part of European international law which was steadfastly ad-
hered to during Italian and German unification and two world wars. Id. at 200. Strict
neutrality has aided the Swiss in attracting foreign assets into comparatively safe bank-
ing institutions. T. FEHRENaACH, THE Swiss BANKS 155 (1966).
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perb infrastructure," it is no wonder that Swiss lawyers, money manag-
ers and banks have been protecting flight capital for over 300 years.'
II. CAPITAL FLIGHT
In the seventeenth century, Protestant Huguenots, including a
large group of French merchants, sought personal and financial safety
in Switzerland in order to escape religious and political persecution
and the confiscation of their property by the Catholic Kings of France."
A century later it was the members of France's Royal House of Bour-
bon and their vassals, who, while fleeing from the French Revolution,
the guillotine and the confiscation of their properties, sought a safe
haven in Switzerland.7
These migrations of individuals and assets in the wake of war and
revolution were often politically motivated.8 Yet, it would be naive to
assume that no money derived from crime ever found its way into
Switzerland via these political refugees. There is no way to prove that
all the assets they brought into Switzerland were indeed theirs. A
leather pouch filled with gold coins and carried by a French nobleman
in the eighteenth century across the Jura passes to Geneva might in-
deed have contained that nobleman's own gold recovered from a vault
in his abandoned chateau. The same gold may have also been stolen
from a wealthy merchant in a village inn along the way.
Today, crime money of all sorts finds its way into Switzerland.
Swiss banks receive money generated through political crime, war
crime, individual crime (e.g., tax violations, insider trading, illegal
laundering, and undisclosed corporate payments) and organized crime
(e.g., narcotics, gambling and other racketeering).9
4. Bowen, Nibbling Away at the Swiss Role, Bus., Dec. 1986, at 117, 118.
5. Reasons for capital to flee include: political instability (especially in developing
countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela and the Philippines), bribery and cor-
ruption, tax evasion, smuggling, violations of securities laws, and drug trafficking. See I.
WALTER, SE-CRET MONEY 39-90 (1985).
6. Note, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 TEx. IN'L L.F. 105, 115 (1970).
7. Id.
8. A significant number of individuals and their assets have migrated to Switzerland
due to European political persecution, war and revolution. Id. For example, Louis XIV's
expression of absolute power, [lJ'etat c'est moi, (I am the state) and his personal disdain
for French Protestants resulted in the exodus of many political opponents and non-
Catholics alike. Richtler, Despotism, in 2 DICTONARY oF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 1, 4-15
(P. Wiener ed. 1973).
9. See J. ZIEGLER, SWITZERLAND: THE AWFUL TRUTH 39-65 (1979).
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III. SILENT TREATMENT
In the nineteenth century, claims for and requests about flight
capital that were made to Swiss banks by powerful countries and
neighbors, such as France and the once mighty Austrian-Hungarian
Habsburg Empire, received nothing but the silent treatment from
Swiss banks. Demands for disclosure in our century have not, however,
fared much better.10 Requests for the disclosure and surrender of Swiss
bank records by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Soviet Russia, and more
recently from the United States, Latin and Central America and many
new Asian and African countries caught up in war, revolution and tur-
moil, have all failed to penetrate the Swiss wall of silence. Both Swit-
zerland's government and its banks, supported by Swiss law, have
steadfastly and consistently refused to lift the veil of bank secrecy.
Meanwhile, the protection and management of flight capital has be-
come a cornerstone of the thriving Swiss banking industry and contin-
ues to attract increasing amounts of money. 1
IV. CHANGING TIMES
Times are changing, however, for it appears that the famous solid
walls of Swiss bank secrecy are showing cracks and signs of stress.
Modern technology and the mass media have disclosed sensational rev-
elations in the last two decades about Swiss-bound flight capital,
thereby putting the once secret transactions of Swiss banks in the
limelight. For instance, a major fissure developed after the Chiasso
scandal in 1977 when Credit Suisse, one of Switzerland's biggest banks,
was found guilty of poor management and breach of fiduciary duty to
its clients. 2 Another crack in the wall of Swiss secrecy resulted from
10. Unable to obtain disclosure from Switzerland, foreign states have resorted to
other means in their attempts to stop tax evasion. For many years, the French govern-
ment has attempted to reclaim money from tax evaders. See Bowen, supra note 4, at
119.
11. See I. WALTER, supra note 5, at 30-31.
12. Chiasso, a small town in the Italian region of Switzerland, was a prime destina-
tion for flight capital from Northern Italy. See generally N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1977, § 4,
at 1, col. 4. Credit Suisse, one of the largest Swiss banks, lost more than $1 billion by
investing in the volatile Italian wine and food industry instead of investing in the more
secure Euromarket. Although Credit Suisse absorbed the losses, the Swiss banking in-
dustry was called into question. The Chiasso affair caused an increase in the power of
Berne's Federal Banking Commission, setting off a series of "gentleman's agreements"
with the United States, and spawning a socialist attack on the banking industry. See
Glynn, Is Time Running Out for Swiss Bank Secrecy?. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov.
1986, at 97; see also I. WALTER, supra note 5, at 98-99. Although the socialists lost a
public referendum to break bank secrecy in 1984, a future attack is not unlikely. See
U.S., Switzerland Move Toward Rules on Swiss Banks' Disclosure of Hot Money, 17
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several United States insider trading cases, in particular the Dennis
Levine insider trading scandal of 1986.8 In that case, computers spot-
ted irregular trading and put United States authorities on the track to
Switzerland. Further damage to the Swiss banking image was caused
by the overthrow of President Duvalier of Haiti, when it became
known that large blocks of Haitian money were stored in Swiss vaults.
The greatest loss of respect to the Swiss image, however, occurred
when the Marcoses' millions turned up in Swiss banks.1
Consequently, the Swiss government and banks have been trying
to repair their image. Not only do they suggest that the veil of secrecy
will be lifted to disclose money generated by criminal activities,'15 but
they are also adapting their laws. For example, Switzerland and the
United States concluded a Memorandum of Understanding on Insider
Trading (MOU) on August 21, 1982, to improve cooperation on the
prosecution of insider trading."
Privately, the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) adopted a "Con-
vention of Diligence" (also known as the "Know Your Customer Agree-
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) at 1559 (Sept. 13, 1985).
13. In the Dennis Levine case, a Panamanian subsidiary of Bank Leu (Switzerland's
sixth largest bank) supplied information about Levine's account to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) following persistent prodding. See Lascelles, A Hole in the
Secret Heart, Fin. Times, Feb. 3, 1987, at 22; see also Trading Pattern Enabled SEC to
Break Levine Insider Trading Case, Lynch Tells Panel, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
at 889 (June 20, 1986). Levine, charged with making $12 million in illegal insider trading,
was convicted and sentenced to two years in prison on February 20, 1987. See Levine
Gets Two Year Jail Term, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1987, at 33, col. 6. The first case where
the SEC broke Swiss bank secrecy was SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D.
111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), where an American, through a Swiss bank, made a $2 million profit
based on inside information of an upcoming merger. The Swiss bank obtained a waiver
of confidentiality from the client when threatened with a $50,000 per day fine and a ban
from trading in the United States. Id. at 113.
14. See Buried Treasure: Much Marcos Wealth Still Carefully Hidden, Eludes In-
vestigators, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1987, at 1, 18.
15. See Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for
Improving International Law Enforcement Cooperation in the Field of Insider Trading,
Aug. 31, 1982, United States-Switzerland, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Understanding].
16. Id.; Note, International Agreements: United States-Switzerland Investigation of
Insider Trading Through Swiss Banks, 23 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 437 (1983) [hereinafter In-
ternational Agreements]; Note, Banking Secrecy and Insider Trading, 23 VA. J. INT'L. L.
605 (1983) [hereinafter Banking Secrecy]. The Swiss Parliament is considering legisla-
tion that would make insider trading illegal. See Bill Clears Swiss Lower Chamber, Wall
St. J., Oct. 8, 1987, at 44, col. 3. The Swiss government has announced plans to make
"laundering" of money a criminal offense. See Switzerland to Make Money Laundering
a Crime and Curb Use of Bank Secrecy Form, 177 Doing Business in Europe (CCH) § 1
(Mar. 19, 1987).
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ment") in 1977.17 This code is based on Article 3 of the Federal Bank-
ing Law, which requires irreproachable conduct by bankers towards
their clients."8 Under this convention, which is supervised by the Fed-
eral Banking Commission, Swiss banks promise not to help foreigners
speculate against the Swiss franc or contravene the exchange controls
of their own countries and, consequently, to exercise "due diligence" in
identifying the true beneficiaries of their accounts. The banks have
thus accepted a good faith duty to identify the real deposit owners and
establish their legitimacy.
Being a democratic country, Switzerland speaks through its citi-
zens, who dislike being called the robber barons of the world. By giving
up what amounts to a limited part of Swiss bank secrecy in Switzer-
land, the banks are appeasing the Swiss people. At the same time the
Swiss banks are making a showing of accepting the international rules
of the game in order to gain the trust necessary to capture their share
of the huge institutional investors' money markets that are housed in
the United States and elsewhere.19 An analysis of the history, the facts
and the legal issues of the Marcos case demonstrates just how far, in
fact, Switzerland has shifted its banking policies in an effort to aid for-
eign governments seeking the recovery of illegally-gained funds.
V. FERDINAND EDRALIN MARCOS, PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
(1965-1986), AND His Swiss BANK ACCOUNTS
On March 24, 1986, at a state dinner for the Finnish President
Mauno Koivisto, the Swiss Council of Ministers (Bundesrat), the coun-
try's seven member executive cabinet, convened for an impromptu
emergency meeting. Huddled in a corner of the ballroom, the
Bundesrat announced a decision which stunned Swiss bankers and for-
17. Agreement of the Signatory Banks and the Swiss Bankers Association with the
Swiss National Bank on the Observance of Care by the Banks in Accepting Funds and
on the Practice of Banking Secrecy of July 1, 1977 (English translation on file in the
Office of the N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L.) [hereinafter Agreement or Know Your
Customer Agreement]. The Agreement, which has five-year terms, was renewed on July
1, 1982 (and signed on Oct. 1, 1982) and on July 1, 1987 (eff. Oct. 1, 1987). See Hawes,
Lee & Roberts, Insider Trading Law Developments: An International Analysis, 14 LAW
& POL'y Bus. 335 (1982); see also Honegger, supra note 2, at 7.
18. Bundesgesetz fiber die Banken und Sparkassen, SYSTEMATISCHE SAMMLUNG DES
BUNDESREDNTS [SR] 952.0 amended SAMMLUNG DER EIDGENOSSISCHEN GESETZE [AS] 808;
La loi federale du 8 Novembre, 1934, RECUEIL SYSTEMATIQUE DU DROIT FEDERAL [RS] 325,
est modifiee RS 952.0 (Federal Law Relating to Banks & Savings Institutions of Nov. 8,
1934, as amended by Federal Law of Mar. 11, 1971) [hereinafter Banking Law].
19. Glynn, supra note 12, at 100. Over the past years, most Swiss banks (more than
583 branches) have been very profitable. With abundant assets, Swiss banks are moving
to other centers abroad. Id.
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eign clients around the globe. The Swiss finance ministry had been
alerted by officers of Credit Suisse in Zurich, when the State dinner
was about to begin,20 that agents of recently deposed" President Ferdi-
nand Marcos were attempting to transfer hundreds of millions of dol-
lars out of Switzerland. Appreciating the urgency of the matter and the
need for immediate action," the Federal Council, under Article 102.8
of the Swiss Constitution,23 ordered an emergency freeze on all assets
held in Switzerland by Ferdinand Edralin Marcos, his family, and by
persons or organizations close to him.24 An official request by the Phil-
ippine government to continue the freeze followed on April 7, 1986.
Before analyzing the subsequent events, it is best to first study
Ferdinand E. Marcos himself, and to understand how he became Presi-
dent of the Philippines and amassed his tremendous wealth. Always
ambitious and militant (as a law student Marcos had been accused,
convicted and subsequently acquitted of killing his father's political
opponent),25 Marcos, like others of his generation, gained prominence
during World War II. His role in the Filipino resistance against the
Japanese Occupation Forces helped him to realize his political ambi-
tions when the Philippines later gained their independence.
Starting as a candidate of the Liberal Party, Marcos later switched
to the Nationalist Party under whose banner he was elected President
of the Philippines on November 8, 1965. His political opponents claim
that even this first Presidential election was tainted by fraud, extor-
tion, bribery and ballot-box tampering. Meanwhile, Marcos and his
former beauty queen wife Imelda Romualdez2 had gained the respect
20. Id. at 97.
21. Id. A Filipino businessman attempted to withdraw $213 million in cash upon
presentation of a power of attorney signed by Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. See
Frontline: In Search of the Marcos Millions, at 5 (PBS television broadcast, May 26,
1987) (transcript on file in the Office of the N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. Law) [hereinaf-
ter Frontline].
22. The Bank was prepared to dispose of the funds the next morning, unless the
Federal Banking Commission instructed them otherwise. See Frontline, supra note 21,
at 6.
23. Article 102.8 of the Swiss Constitution states: "[The Federal Council] shall watch
over the external interests of the Confederation particularly its international relations,
and it shall be in charge of external affairs generally." Bundesverfassung [BV] art. 102.8,
Constitution federale [CST] art. 102.8, Costituzione federale [CosT. FED.] art. 102.8
(Switz.).
24. Glynn, supra note 12, at 97.
25. See C. PEDROSA, IMELDA MARcos 73-74 (1987) [hereinafter IMELDA].
26. Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos married exactly eleven days after they first met.
Marcos was attracted to Imelda due to her highly respected family name, Romualdez
(although she came from the poor branch), and her beauty. Marcos thought these two
assets would be of good use in the political career he had ambitiously planned for him-
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of several American presidents, who invariably praised them for being
true allies in the Pacific-allies whose anti-communism was
unquestionable."
However, many Filipinos thought differently. President Marcos
was re-elected in 1969 for a second term;2" but, by law, he had to look
to 1973 as his last year in office. 9 During this second term, his opposi-
tion, especially the Liberal Party, became more vocal. They accused
Marcos, the leader of the Nationalist Party, and his associates, of cor-
ruption, fraud, theft and extortion. On August 21, 1971, at a Liberal
Party rally at the Plaza Miranda in the heart of Manila, fragmentation
bombs were hurled from the crowd toward the speaker's platform.
Many were killed and wounded." That same night, President Marcos
addressed the nation and accused the communists of this mysterious
attack, a fact which forced him, he said, to suspend habeas corpus and
to arrest political opponents as enemies of the state. A year later, in
1972, the Philippine Constitution itself was suspended. From that
point on, Marcos continued his dictatorial reign under martial law (he
issued his own constitution in 1973)"' until his ouster and flight to Ha-
self. Id. at 74-80.
27. As a former United States colony, as well as an important naval base in the Pa-
cific, the Philippines occupied a special place with Americans, who were eager to main-
tain good relations. On the other hand, many Filipinos sought to sever ties, definitely
and completely, from their former colonialists. See McManus, Huge Stakes Led U.S. to
Take Role in Key Asian Ally's Election, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1986, at 28, col. 1.; see also
Leahy, Writing a New Chapter for the Philippines, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 20,
1986, at 1, col. 3.
28. See IMELDA, supra note 25, at 125. Although he was already embroiled in scandal
by 1969, Marcos won the election by portraying himself as a nationalist and identifying
his opponent with the unpopular cause of giving too much deference to the prior colo-
nialist, the United States. Marcos was the first president of the Philippines to serve a
second term. Id.
29. At that time, the Philippine Constitution limited presidents to two four-year
terms. PHIL. CONST. of 1935, art. VII, § 5. The constitution of 1973, however, provided for
a six-year term. PHIL. CONST. of 1973, art. VII, § 5. The present constitution limits presi-
dents to one six-year term with no opportunity for re-election. PHIL. CONST. of 1986, art.
VII, § 4.
30. Returning Opposition Figure Hopes to Avoid Aquino's Fate, L.A. Times, Jan. 6,
1985, at 4, col. 1. One of the speakers, Liberal Senator Jovito Salonga, miraculously sur-
vived. Suffering from over 100 shrapnel wounds, the loss of an eye, and the loss of hear-
ing in one ear, Salonga paid a high price for his political courage. Id.
31. Marcos had long been playing with the idea of instituting martial law, which he
saw as the only way to continue his presidency. Earlier he had tried to amend the consti-
tution to open up the possibility of a third presidential term. He also had attempted,
unsuccessfully, to promote Imelda for the presidency. See IMELDA, supra note 25, at 128.
During martial law, many heads fell. Political opponents such as Senators Aquino and
Salonga were first jailed, then exiled. Upon returning to Manila on Aug. 21, 1983, Aquino
was gunned down while disembarking from the plane at the Manila airport. Id. at 135-
19881
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waii on February 25, 1986, following the election of Corazon Aquino as
President by the People's Power.
During his years in office Marcos probably orchestrated one of the
greatest thefts in history. 2 Documents found in his bedroom safe in
the abandoned Malacanang Palace and in his confiscated luggage upon
arrival in the United States irrefutably established that the Marcoses
smuggled vast amounts of money and other assets into Switzerland."3
The first accounts (for which the Marcoses used pseudonyms) 4 were
probably those they established with Credit Suisse in Zurich on
March 20, 1968, less than thirty months after Marcos assumed the
Presidency." Subsequent accounts were opened with Swiss banks in
the cantons of Zurich, Geneva, Fribourg, Lucerne and Lausanne. In ad-
dition, several Liechtenstein foundations36 were created. 7
As President, Ferdinand Marcos created government monopolies
for practically every commercial activity in the Philippines. There was
the sugar monopoly, the coconut monopoly, the energy monopoly, the
banana monopoly and many others. Trusted associates were put in
36, 196. This murder marked the beginning of the end of the Marcos regime.
32. In 1965, when former President Ferdinand Marcos took office, the Philippines led
the ASEAN region in per capita income. Now, the Philippines have the lowest per capita
income of any ASEAN nation. See ASEAN Growth Slowed, But Region Offers Invest-
ment Opportunities, Speakers Say, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 755 (June 4, 1986).
33. See Azurin v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 30 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). The Court of
International Trade denied an attempt by Marcos's agents to release confiscated prop-
erty at an Hawaiian airport. Id.
34. See Progress Reported on Marcos's Swiss Money, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1986, at 6,
col. 1. Mr. Marcos chose the pseudonym William Saunders and Mrs. Marcos chose the
name Jane Ryan. The accounts were for $950,000. Frontline, supra note 2i, at 7.
35. Switzerland maintains named accounts and numbered accounts, both covered by
banking secrecy laws. In a named account, cashiers and other bank employees have ac-
cess to the agreement establishing the account and the signature card of the owner. In a
numbered account, the identity of the owner is revealed to very few people. Although
bank employees may know the existence of the account, all but one or two senior execu-
tives are ignorant of the owner's name. Fictitious names or dummy corporations can be
used to obtain even greater secrecy. The purpose of numbered accounts is to guarantee
owners a higher degree of secrecy, by shielding their identity from most of the bank's
own employees. See I. WALTER, supra note 5, at 30-31. See also Meyer, supra note 1, at
28.
36. A Liechtenstein foundation provides almost absolute secrecy. The name of the
beneficial owner (which may be an individual or a foreign corporation) appears only in
the fiduciary agreement with a Liechtenstein lawyer, who protects the secrecy of his cli-
ents with his professional privilege. The foundation becomes a legal entity upon deposit-
ing the articles of foundation, which are not open to the public. The foundation is also
exempt from publishing financial statements. See LIECHTENSTEIN: PERSONEN-UND
GESELLSCHAFTRECHT [PGR] art. 552-570; see also I. WALTER supra note 5, at 33.
37. Such foundations can be created on a banker's desk in Switzerland. See generally
I. WALTER, supra note 5; see also supra note 36.
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charge, and in return they paid commissions to President Marcos."s No
sugar, coconuts, bananas or other products could be bought or sold
without the trustees' permission."s The same system was used for the
granting of import, export and construction licenses.4 0 Furthermore,
evidence found in Palace Malacanang shows that similar arrangements
were made in connection with the huge Japanese war reparations."'
There are also instances of direct transfers from the Philippine
treasury of money earmarked for official purposes, such as the Intelli-
gence Fund, to Marcos's personal secret bank accounts in Switzer-
land. 2 There were even gold transports made directly from the Philip-
pines to Switzerland. Some of these may even have continued after the
Marcoses' downfall, causing the Swiss Banking Commission to be espe-
cially cautious of unusual transactions.43 Finally, there were other ways
the Marcoses enlarged their secret accounts." Questions still remain,
38. Frontline, supra note 21, at 11. "The presidential papers itemize some of the
'donations.' In just three weeks, one business donated over a hundred thousand dollars."
Id.
39. Id. at 10-11. For instance, the sugar monopoly was in the hands of Bobby Bene-
dicto, a law school classmate of Marcos, who had helped Marcos arrange his affairs in
Switzerland and Liechtenstein. Id.
40. In the North-South highway scam, for instance, President Marcos took a 15%
cut. According to a study sponsored in 1968 by the Asia Society (which included ten
American members), the monopolization of major industries and commodity production
by friends of Marcos put the country behind other Asian countries that developed vi-
brant export sectors. See Market Access More Important Than Aid to Philippines
Economy, Study Group Reports, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 549 (Apr. 23, 1986).
41. See Frontline, supra note 21, at 13. Japanese companies, funded by the Japanese
government, undertook to rebuild roads, bridges and harbor installations that were de-
stroyed during World War II. Part of the moneys earmarked for reconstruction was dis-
creetly and continuously transferred by Japanese companies to secret, numbered bank
accounts in Switzerland. In just one five-month period, kickbacks amounted to $2.7 mil-
lion. Id.
42. See id. at 12. As martial ruler, Mr. Marcos controlled the treasury single-
handedly. Philippine banks, like the Development Bank, operated completely under his
control. According to Eduardo Olaguer, Governor of the Development Bank, his bank
had easily paid out $3.5 million to Marcos groups for phony projects. Id.
43. Marcos Bid to Stash Gold in Australia, Newspapers Report, Associated Press,
Mar. 5, 1986. It was reported that Qantas Airlines was asked by Philippine government
officials, two days before the election that resulted in the end of the Marcos regime, to
ship 10 tons of gold bullion to Sydney, Australia. Id.
44. For example, the Marcoses acquired several New York and California properties,
the right to ownership of which is presently before the United States courts. Compare
Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986) with Republic of the Phil. v.
Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1986). On essentially the same facts, the Second Circuit
granted a preliminary injunction to freeze the New York properties subject to further
litigation, while the Ninth Circuit denied such injunction concerning the California
properties. The Ninth Circuit seemed concerned that it would be forced to litigate the
19881
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however, as to how much money was transferred and deposited by
Marcos and his associates in Swiss banks, how much has since been
taken out and to where, and how much money is still there. Although
many have guessed-for example Philippine authorities have esti-
mated a total illegal transfer of billions of dollars-definitive answers
in the Marcos case will remain clouded until the Swiss lift their bank
secrecy veil.45
VI. THE FORTRESS OF Swiss BANKING SECRECY
The old Swiss bulwarks of bank secrecy, which are hiding the
Marcos treasure behind their solid walls, are founded on: (1) privacy
and tort law, (2) contract and agency law, and (3) criminal law. A
newer wall was created by the criminal sanctions of the Federal Bank-
ing Law of 193446 and most recently by a loophole in the bankers' self-
policing "Know Your Customer Agreement" of 1977."' Connected,
these walls of Swiss bank secrecy form a mighty fortress.
A. The First Wall: Privacy and Tort Law
Privacy in financial matters enjoys high priority in Switzerland.
Not only must lawyers, doctors and clergymen guard their clients'
secrets, so too must bankers. Thus, Article 28 of the Civil Code (under
the title "Protection of the Personality, Complaint for Injury") entitles
an injured person to request an injunction. 8 Further protection of se-
crecy rights is derived from tort law. Article 41 of the Code of Obliga-
tions allows an individual to sue for damages for negligent or inten-
tional injury caused by another, while under Article 49 of the same
actual title to the properties, which it considered outside its realm. It thus denied a
preliminary injunction, arguing that the plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the merits.
A "net worth" approach would fail, held the court, since many of the assets would be
immune under the act of state and political question doctrines. The court also argued
that the plaintiff would be unable to link the properties to specific illegal money. The
Second Circuit downplayed the act of state doctrine, holding that: (1) the defendant had
failed to prove that the challenged acts of Marcos were in fact public and not private
acts; (2) Marcos was no longer the head of state; and (3) by initiating the litigation, the
Philippines had weakened the doctrine's application. Litigation concerning title to the
New York properties is taking place in Willemstad in the Netherland Antilles. See
Gevecht om Fortuin Marcos Speelt Zich Nu Af Op Antillen (Battle for Marcos Millions
Now Rages in Antilles), Volkskrant, Sept. 30, 1987.
45. Frontline, supra note 21, at 27. "Some say they have five, others ten billion dol-
lars. The presidential papers we have obtained suggest an absolute minimum of 2.1 bil-
lion dollars." Id.
46. See supra note 18.
47. See generally, Agreement, supra note 17, and accompanying text.
48. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 24 n.27.
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Code, suit may be brought for damages or equitable relief for harm to
an individual's personal affairs."'
B. The Second Wall: Contract and Agency Rights
In addition to violating express contractual obligations, a banker
who reveals secrets about his clients' bank accounts may be held liable
for breach of implied contract because a duty to remain silent is im-
plied by law.50 Further, under agency law a banker owes his client a
continuing duty of loyalty, giving rise to breach of fiduciary claims. Ar-
ticles 397 and 398, respectively, of the Code of Obligations, set forth an
agent's duty to follow directions received from his principal and his
general obligation to faithfully and carefully carry out the services of
the agency." A fiduciary duty thus arises and guarantees secrecy even
before a contract has actually been concluded.
C. The Third Wall: Criminal Law
Banking secrecy is further protected by provisions of the criminal
code. It is a crime to: (1) disclose a business secret to an official of a
foreign government (Article 273), (2) reveal a business secret that a
person has a legal or contractual obligation to protect (Article 162), or
(3) disseminate confidential facts if disclosure would impair a client's
resources (Article 159)."1 The purpose of these provisions was to pro-
tect the Swiss economy more effectively against spying activities."3
These provisions did not adequately protect bank secrecy during the
banking crisis of the early thirties, however, creating a situation which
gave rise to a federal criminal code.' 4
D. The Fourth Wall: The Federal Banking Law of 1934
The fundamental wall of Swiss bank secrecy is the Federal Bank-
ing Law of 1934." This comprehensive statute governing bank secrecy
was enacted in the wake of two sensational historical events in the
early thirties. During the depression of the thirties, there was first the
collapse of the Banque d' Escompte Suisse of Geneva, which caused
49. Id.; see also Hurd, Insider Trading and Foreign Bank Secrecy, 24 AM. Bus. L.J.
25, 29 (1986).
50. See Note, supra note 6, at 117.
51. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 24 n.27.
52. See Hurd, supra note 49, at 28.
53. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 24 n.34.
54. Id. at n.30.
55. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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nervous investors to plead for federal protection of deposits. 6 A second
cry for protection came from German Jews, who sought a hiding place
in Switzerland for themselves and their assets from Adolf Hitler and
his Nazi regime. Not only did German exchange control laws impose
the death penalty on illegal foreign transfer, but Berlin also sent Ge-
stapo agents and Nazi investigators into Switzerland to trace and seize
assets held in Swiss bank accounts by German Jews. Since some Swiss
(in spite of possible criminal and civil sanctions) revealed Jewish bank
deposits to the Gestapo, the privacy of the Swiss banking community
and the confidence in the Swiss banking system was threatened.5 7
The Swiss government, in response, enacted the Federal Banking
Law of 1934. Article 47, the cornerstone of the Act, punishes illegal
disclosures. The penalty for willful disclosures is a maximum fine of
50,000 Swiss francs, or up to six months in prison; for negligent disclo-
sures the fine is a maximum of 30,000 Swiss francs.5 8 The Banking
Law, however, does not define bank secrecy or change existing obliga-
tions; it merely increases the penalty for illegal disclosure. The courts,
therefore, must determine on a case-by-case basis whether the duty of
secrecy has been breached. Unlike the remaining provisions of the
Banking Law, which are enforced by federal officials, Article 47 viola-
tions fall within the jurisdiction of the cantons."
The Banking Law also created the Federal Banking Commission
to supervise and implement the Banking Law. The functions of the
Banking Commission include the duty to make regulations, to inter-
pret the law, and to supervise auditing procedures and reorganizations.
The Commission is elected by and under the direct control of the Fed-
eral Council.60
56. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 25.
57. See Hurd, supra note 49, at 29.
58. Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 47(l)-(2). These subsections state that;
1. Anyone who, in his capacity as officer or executive, in his capacity as an
employee, agent, as liquidator or trustee of the bank, as observer from the Bank
Commission, or an officer or executive of an approved auditing firm, reveals any
secret which was confided to him or which he learned in his capacity or employ-
ment, or anyone who incites others to violate the professional secret, will be pun-
ished by a maximum of 6 months imprisonment or by a fine not exceeding
50,000 francs.
2. If the offender has acted negligently, the punishment will be a fine not ex-
ceeding 30,000 francs.
Id.
59. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 27. Switzerland is a loose confederation of cantons
and half cantons (twenty-six and one-half), with a relatively weak central government.
Id.
60. See Meyer, supra note 1, at 25. Once a weak institution, the Federal Banking
Commission is now a watchdog organization in charge of supervising Swiss banking eth-
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E. The Fifth Wall: The Dummy Paragraph of the "Know Your
Customer Agreement"
In 1977, Swiss bankers attempted to put their house in order by
establishing the self-policing good conduct code called the "Know Your
Customer Agreement." The Swiss Bankers Association agreed therein
to carefully examine a customer's identity in order to prevent assets
from being invested in the Swiss banking system anonymously.6" How-
ever this voluntary agreement has one big loophole. Clients can conceal
their identity by opening accounts through a Swiss lawyer or notary, 8
both of whom enjoy a professional duty of secrecy. When representing
clients, lawyers need only sign a form (Form-B) in which they declare
that they are familiar with the "economic beneficiary" and unaware of
any inadmissible business within the meaning of the Agreement. This
is the notorious Article 6 of the Agreement, known as the "dummy" or
Strohmanner paragraph." The form thus allows lawyers or notaries to
take responsibility for a customer's good standing,"5 and since profes-
ice. See Glynn, supra note 12, at 99.
61. See Agreement, supra note 17.
62. The agreement was captured in the Introduction, art. 1, Preamble, of the Agree-
ment. Id.
63. Unlike in the United States, where notaries merely certify documents, notaries in
civil law countries like Switzerland are highly trained, appointed officials, with numerous
duties including the drafting of articles of incorporation, pre-nuptial agreements, real
estate transfers, and the like.
64. Agreement, supra note 17, art. 6. Article 6 states:
(1) Where a customer acts through a person domiciled or with a registered of-
fice in Switzerland who is bound by a legally protected professional secrecy,
or who is a member of an association affiliated to the 'Schweizerische Treu-
hand-und Revisionskammer/Chambre Suisse des Societes fiduciaires et des
Experts-comptables,' the bank must obtain from such a person on Form B
a written declaration to the effect that the beneficial owner is known to him
and no forbidden transaction within the meaning of this agreement is being
concluded.
(2) A written declaration is waived in the case of accounts and deposits of do-
mestic and foreign banks.
Id.
65. Despite advice by the Banking Commission to restrict the use of Form-B, the
Swiss Bankers Association refused to replace it. Switzerland to Make Money Launder-
ing a Crime and Curb Use of Bank Secrecy Form, 177 Doing Bus. In Europe (CCH) 1,
19 (Mar. 19, 1987). Still, the 1987 Agreement added a new paragraph which provides
some safeguards against the use of "dummy" lawyers. This new paragraph reads:
In this declaration, the person bound by professional confidentiality must
confirm that he or she knows the beneficial owner and that, having displayed
due diligence, he or she is not aware of any fact that might indicate that the
beneficiary is abusing the right to banking secrecy, or, in particular, that the
assets concerned are the fruit of any criminal activity. Further, said person must
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sionals are shielded by their professional privilege, this responsibility
poses few risks."' Meanwhile, depositors enjoy double protection. They
are insulated by bank secrecy laws as well as by the lawyer's or no-
tary's professional privilege.
Obviously, some bankers have been misusing this loophole by
bringing in lawyers who are unfamiliar with their clients or uncon-
cerned with where the money comes from, but who are nevertheless
willing to sign Form-B for a fee.6" Evidence found in the Malacanang
Palace sustains this position. In a letter to President Marcos, a Swiss
money manager instructed him to appoint a certain lawyer as the rep-
resentative of one of his Liechtenstein foundations because "the inde-
pendent lawyer can offer the additional secrecy of his professional
privilege."68
VII. CRACKS IN THE WALL
Cracks in the wall of secrecy result from: (1) the criminal law, (2)
bilateral and multilateral agreements, and (3) the new Federal Law of
Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters (IMAC) of March 20, 1981,
confirm that he or she is acting in his/her professional capacity as attorney, no-
tary, fiduciary, trustee or asset administrator, that such powers conferred upon
him/her are not merely of a provisional nature, nor are they aimed primarily at
concealing the name of the beneficial owner from the bank.
Id.
66. Article 321(1) of the Swiss Penal Code states:
Violation of Vocational Secrets:
1. Clergymen, attorneys, defenders, notaries public, secrecy bound auditor
according to the Code of Obligations doctors, dentists, pharmacists, mid-
wives, and their assisting personnel, who divulge a secret entrusted to
them, or of which they have become aware in their professional capacity,
shall, on petition, be punished by imprisonment or by a fine. Students who
divulge a secret they have become aware of during their study are pun-
ished as well. The violation of a professional secrecy remains punishable
even after termination of the exercise of the profession or after termina-
tion of the study.
Code penal suisse [C.P.] art. 321(1) (Switz.).
67. Although refusing to change Form-B, the Bankers Association agreed to set up a
committee of independent observers to ensure (subject to a fine of 10 million Swiss
Francs) that the secrecy is not to be used temporarily or merely to assure anonymity for
ordinary bank clients. Swiss Banking: Confidentiality of Financial Transactions in
Switzerland Will Diminish Somewhat Later This Year, Bus. INr'L, Mar. 30, 1987, at 103;
see also the new paragraph cited at supra note 65. Further, new Form-B notes that the
bank may disclose the attorney's name to a requesting state in judicial assistance proce-
dures. See Swiss Banking: Confidentiality of Financial Transactions in Switzerland
Will Diminish Somewhat Later This Year, supra.
68. Zanetti, Liebe Excellenz, SCHWEIZER ILLUSTRIERTE, Oct. 6, 1986, at 175.
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which went into effect on January 1, 1983."
A. Criminal and Civil Proceedings
Generally, when called to testify in Swiss criminal cases, federal
and most cantonal procedural laws prohibit bankers from invoking the
secrecy privilege.7 0 Thus, when asked under oath in criminal cases,
bankers must reveal their clients' names and accounts.
Information sought by other countries, however, is only provided if
the conduct is also considered criminal in Switzerland. For example,
tax evasion (non-declaration of taxes) as opposed to tax fraud (falsify-
ing of records) is not a crime in Switzerland." Also, insider trading,
which the United States views as clearly unlawful, has not risen to a
criminal offense in Switzerland as yet.7 2 Furthermore, even if "double
criminality" exists, Switzerland cooperates with foreign investigations
only when obligated to by an international treaty. Consequently, Swiss
bank secrecy has rarely been lifted even in criminal cases.
B. Multilateral and Bilateral Treaties
Since treaties are a sine qua non for Swiss cooperation in foreign
criminal matters, many countries have entered multilateral or bilateral
treaties with Switzerland. Switzerland is a party to the European Con-
vention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.7 3 This Convention
is a broad arrangement which covers extradition and the enforcement
69. Bundesgesetz fiber internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, Systematische Sam-
miung des Bundesrechts [SR] 351.1, AS 1982 846 (translation by Dr. Lionel Frei and
H.P. Wyssman of the Federal Office for Police Matters (Berne), on file at the New York
Law School Library) [hereinafter IMAC].
70. Honegger, supra note 2, at 6. Switzerland has federal criminal codes which apply
uniformly in all cantons. Yet efforts to testify in court and furnish information to the
government in criminal cases is not centrally regulated, but is subject to federal or can-
tonal jurisdiction. For example, Article 47 of the Banking Law provides that "federal and
cantonal regulations concerning the obligations to testify and to furnish information to a
governmental authority shall remain reserved." Banking Law, supra note 18, art. 47. The
codes of civil procedure differ. Under the Federal Law of Civil Procedure, bankers must
testify in civil cases; the cantons differ. Eight cantons uphold bank secrecy, eleven deny
it, and the remainder leave the determination to the judge.
71. See Hurd, supra note 49, at 31 n.53.
72. See Bill Clears Swiss Lower Chamber, supra note 16. This may soon change,
however. The Swiss government has also proposed criminalizing money laundering. See
Switzerland To Make Money Laundering A Crime and Curb Use of Bank Secrecy
Form, supra note 16.
73. SR 0.351.1, cited in Federal Office for Police Matters, IMAC Guidelines (1983)
[hereinafter Guidelines].
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of foreign judgments as well as giving assistance in criminal matters.
On a more limited scope, Switzerland has concluded several bilateral
agreements, ' the most important of which is the Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters of January 23, 1977 with the United
States.7" With the Mutual Assistance Treaty the United States sought
to lift Switzerland's bank secrecy laws, especially in cases where they
were used to protect tax violations, insider trading and organized crime
activities. Although this goal has not been fully accomplished, Switzer-
land and the United States are establishing an evolving working
relationship.7
C. IMAC
Since Switzerland was under no obligation to assist foreign investi-
gations in the absence of a treaty, and even with a treaty the rules
were not always clear, Switzerland unilaterally adopted the Federal Act
on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters on March, 20,
1981, effective January 1, 1983.7 The purpose of this Act was to
streamline Swiss cooperation with all nations in connection with a
broad range of international criminal matters. For example, IMAC gov-
erns: (1) extradition of persons who are the subject of criminal prose-
cution, (2) assistance aimed at supporting criminal proceedings abroad,
(3) the transfer of proceedings and the punishment of offenders, and
(4) the execution of foreign criminal judgments.7 s Help under IMAC is
conditioned upon whether the requesting state would offer reciprocity
to Switzerland if Switzerland were to ask for similar assistance.79
74. With West Germany (SR 0.351.913.61/62) and Austria (SR 0.351.916.32/321), for
instance. See Guidelines, supra note 73, at 3. No such agreement exists with the
Philippines.
75. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 23, 1977, United States-Switzerland,
27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter Mutual Assistance Treaty]. Switzerland
has enacted a law implementing that treaty (SR 351.93). Guidelines, supra note 73, at 2.
76. See International Agreements, supra note 16, at 439; see also Meyer, supra note
1, at 62; Honegger, supra note 2, at 13; Note, The Recent Swiss-American Treaty to
Render Mutual Assistance in Criminal Law Enforcement (an application of the Bank
Secrecy Act): Panacea or Placebo?, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 103 (1974).
77. See IMAC, supra note 69, and accompanying text.
78. See id. arts. 32-62, 63-84, 85-93, 74-108.
79. See id. art. 8(1). As a rule, a request shall be granted only if the requesting state
guarantees reciprocity. The Federal Office for Police Matters of the Federal Department
of Justice and Police (Federal Office) may require a guarantee of reciprocity if this is
deemed necessary.
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1. Principles and Scope
Assistance under IMAC is not a matter of right but rests within
the discretion of the Swiss authorities.80 In considering requests, Swiss
authorities must take into account the sovereignty and security of the
state8' and the effect that the requested assistance would have on the
Swiss economy.8 2
IMAC's section on assistance in criminal matters is probably the
most important.8 According to Article 63, that assistance may consist
of the giving of information, aiding in litigation, or the returning of
proceeds.8 ' Article 74 additionally provides for the surrender of ob-
jects." IMAC thus allows the lifting of bank secrecy as well as the re-
turn of the disclosed bank accounts' contents to the rightful owners."s
A state may also ask, pursuant to Article 18, for the "freezing" of an
account's assets pending further review of the request for assistance.8 7
IMAC has retained the dual criminality rule. Assistance will thus
be granted only if the type of crime committed abroad would also be a
80. Id. art. 1(4) ("This act shall confer no right to demand international
cooperation.").
81. Id. art. 1(2) ("In the application of this act, the sovereignty, security, public order
or similar interest of Switzerland shall be taken into account.").
82. Id. art. 10(2). Disclosure of manufacturing or business secrets in the sense of Arti-
cle 273 of the Swiss Penal Code, or of facts which a bank must usually keep secret, shall
not be allowed if it may be assumed to cause essential prejudice to the Swiss economy
and does not appear justified in relation to the seriousness of the offense. Id.
83. Id. pt. 3 ("Other Acts of Assistance.").
84. Id. art. 63(1)-(2). Assistance within the meaning of this part shall comprise the
transmission of information, as well as procedural and other official acts permit-
ted under Swiss law, as far as these acts appear to be necessary for proceedings
carried out abroad in criminal matters or serve to retrieve the proceeds of the
offense... [a~cts of assistance shall include in particular: service of documents,
obtaining of evidence, production of records or papers, search of persons or
rooms, seizure, confrontation and transit of persons.
Id.
85. Id. art. 74. This article states that:
1. Upon request, objects, particularly documents and valuables whose seizure
is permitted by Swiss law, as well as official records and decisions, shall be
placed at the disposal of the authorities competent in criminal matters or for
issuing or withdrawing driving licenses, as far as these objects may be of
significance in their decision.
2. Other objects and valuables originating from an offense may be surren-
dered for the purpose of returning them to the entitled person even outside
criminal proceedings in the requesting State.
Id.
86. IMAC has not yet established a precedent for the return of proceeds. Id.
87. Id. art. 18.
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crime under Swiss law (albeit under a different name)."8 Further, assis-
tance is limited to those criminal matters which can be appealed to a
judge in the requesting state."0
There are also limitations which may apply due to procedural de-
fects or the nature of the offense. For example, if the foreign procedure
violated basic human rights," is a subterfuge for punishing an individ-
ual's political beliefs, associations, race, religion or nationality, 91 or has
other serious defects," assistance will be denied. Also, if the crime is of
a political or fiscal nature, is in violation of military duty, or is directed
against the national defense, IMAC denies cooperation. 3
2. Procedure
Requests for assistance must be submitted by persons authorized
to investigate crimes or render certain decisions94 and must be directed
to the Federal Office of Police in Berne." Article 28 prescribes the
form and content of the request. The request must: (1) be in writing
(in German, French or Italian)," (2) state its source, reason and sub-
88. Id. art. 64(1). Measures according to Article 63 which require the application of
compulsory measures may be ordered only if the description of the relevant facts of the
case shows that the offence prosecuted abroad contains the elements, other than intent
or negligence, of an offence punishable according to Swiss law. They have to be carried
out in accordance with Swiss law. Id.
89. "This act shall apply only to criminal matters in which an appeal to a judge can
be made according to the law of the requesting state." Id. art. 1(3).
90. A request will not be granted if the proceeding: does not "meet the procedural
requirements of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms of 4th November, 1950 .. " Id. art. 2(a).
91. A request will not be granted if the proceeding "is carried out so as to prosecute
or punish a person on account of his political opinions, his belonging to a certain social
group, his race, religion or nationality .... " Id. art. 2(b).
92. Assistance will be denied, for instance, if the foreign proceeding "could result in
aggravating the situation of the person pursued for any of the reasons mentioned under
letter b... [or if the proceeding].. .is tainted with other grave defects." Id. art. 2(c)-(d).
93. Id. art. 3(1), (3). A request shall not be granted if the subject of the proceeding is
an act which, according to the Swiss concept, has a predominantly political character,
constitutes a violation of the obligation to perform military or similar service, or appears
to be directed against the national defense or military strength of the requesting state.
Id. art. 3(1). In addition, a request "shall not be granted if the subject of the proceeding
is an offence which appears to be aimed at reducing fiscal duties or taxes or which vio-
lates regulations concerning currency, trade or economic policy." Id. art. 3(3).
94. Id. art. 75(1) ("Requests for assistance may be submitted by authorities which are
competent to investigate offences or to render decisions in other proceedings to which
this act is applicable.").
95. Id. art. 27(2) ("Foreign requests shall be addressed directly to the Federal
Office.").
96. Id. art. 28(1), (5). If a foreign request is not submitted in German, French or
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ject matter,97 (3) identify the accused,9 s and (4) contain sufficient sup-
porting data."9 Upon a finding that: (1) the requesting state grants reci-
procity, (2) the request is proper as to form and content (incomplete
requests may be supplemented leaving the freeze intact), 00 and (3)
that assistance will not jeopardize Switzerland's sovereignty, security
or economy, the Federal Police will send the request on to the appro-
priate cantonal authorities.'
The cantonal authorities must then decide whether to grant assis-
tance,'0° and in doing so they must consider the merit of the request'03
according to their own procedural rules.' " If a request is deemed ad-
missible, the judge may then order to continue the case and to seize
the necessary documents. 05 The judge draws up an inventory of any
such seized documents, and if the documents are subject to bank se-
crecy and the order is contested, the list will be put in safekeeping.' 0
Italian, it must be accompanied "by a translation into one of these languages." Id. art.
28(5).
97. Id. art. 28(2). The request must contain "the office from which it emanates and if
necessary, the authority having criminal jurisdiction... the subject matter of and the
reason for the request. . .the legal qualification of the offence .... Id. art. 28(a)-(c).
98. Id. art. 28(2)(d). The request must contain "indications as exact and comprehen-
sive as possible on the person being the target of the criminal proceeding." Id.
99. Id. art. 28(3). A request must also contain "a summary of the relevant facts, ex-
cept in cases of requests for service of process... [and] the text of the regulations appli-
cable at the place where the offence was committed." Id.
100. Id. art. 28(6). If a request does not meet the formal requirements, the Federal
Office may demand its completion or correction. Id.
101. Id. arts. 77(1), 78(1). Requests must "be addressed to the appropriate cantonal
authority through the intermediary of the Federal Office." Id. art. 77(1). The Federal
Office, in turn, will determine whether "the request meets the formal requirements of
this act and forward it to the appropriate cantonal authority unless assistance appears to
be obviously inadmissible." Id. art. 78(1).
102. Id. art. 79(1). The cantonal authorities shall decide on the granting of assistance
and on questions of interstate procedure unless a federal authority is exclusively compe-
tent to do so. Id.
103. Id. pt. 3, ch. 2, § 1, art. 79(2) ("Insofar direct contacts between the competent
Swiss and foreign prosecuting authorities are agreed upon, they deal with the merits of
the requests .... ).
104. Id. pt. 1, ch. 2, § 3, art. 12 ("If this act does not specify otherwise, the federal
administrative authorities shall apply, by analogy, the Federal Act on Administrative
Procedure and the cantonal authorities their own procedural rules. The procedure rules
observed in criminal matters shall apply to acts of procedure.").
105. For a recent case on IMAC procedures, see Judgement of Feb. 4, 1987, BGE I,
10-11 [hereinafter Geneva Appellate Case]. If the request is deemed incomplete, the
judge may ask for additional information or refuse the request (page numbers refer to an
English translation available at the Office of N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L.).
106. Geneva Appellate Case, supra note 105, pt. II, No. 8(d)-(e), at 13; IMAC, supra
note 69, pt. 3, ch. 1, 2, art. 83(2). "The documents of execution may be delivered to the
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The judge must decide whether to communicate in full or in part those
documents subject to secrecy. 107 Where the request concerns merely
the transmission of seized documents the judge may order the case
closed, decree that the documents be transmitted to the requesting
state, and transfer the file to the Federal Office for Police Matters.'" If
further steps have to be taken the closing order must wait. 09
All orders must be in writing stating their grounds and that an
appeal may be taken.110 Generally, appeals do not suspend the obliga-
tion to remit the seized documents to the judge; however, appeals
against closing orders suspend the transmission of secret documents to
a foreign state."' Both intermediate and closing orders by the highest
cantonal authority may be appealed directly to the Federal Supreme
Court.' Throughout the process, the Federal Banking Office coordi-
nates the requests which are pending before several cantonal courts." s
requesting authority (a) if no appeals were made during the execution of the request; (b)
if the check under paragraph 1 shows that neither secrets of third persons are affected
nor that there are doubts regarding the granting of assistance." Id.
107. Geneva Appellate Case, supra note 105, pt. II, No. 8(f), at 14.
108. IMAC, supra note 69, pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2, art. 83(1), (2). These provisions state that:
(1) When the executing authority considers the assistance proceeding concluded,
it shall forward the files to the competent cantonal or federal authority. This
authority shall check whether the request has been executed correctly and, if
necessary, return the files to the executing authority for completion. (2) The
documents of execution may be delivered to the requesting authority (a) if no
appeals were made during the execution of the request; (b) if the check under
paragraph 1 shows that neither secrets of third persons are affected nor that
there are doubts regarding the granting of assistance.
Id.
109. Id. pt. 3, ch. 1, § 2, art. 83(1).
110. Id. pt. 1, ch. 3, § 2, art. 22 ("(1) Decrees and decisions of federal and cantonal
authorities shall be valid only if they provide with notice regarding legal remedies. (2)
The notice regarding legal remedies must mention the appeal allowed, the court to which
the appeal shall lie and the time for appealing.").
111. Id. pt. 1, ch. 3, § 2, art. 21(4) ("The appeal of a decree which grants...the
release of information from the privacy has a suspensive effect .... ").
112. Id. pt. 1, ch. 3, § 2, art. 25(1). "Decrees of federal authorities of the first instance
and of the highest cantonal appellate authorities shall be subject to administrative court
appeal directly to the Federal (Supreme) Court in so far as this act does not otherwise
stipulate." Id.
113. Id. pt. 3, ch. 2, § 2, art. 80 ("If the execution of a request necessitates investiga-
tions in several cantons, the Federal Office may charge the competent authority of one of
these Cantons with directing the investigations."); see also id. pt. 1, ch. 3, § 2, art. 25(3)
("The Federal Office may file appeals of decrees of the highest cantonal appellate au-
thorities. The cantonal authority is entitled to appeal against the refusal of the Federal
Office to make a request.").
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VIII. THE PHILIPPINE RESPONSE
Outraged for years by the dictatorial and excessive lifestyles of the
Marcos family and their enclave, the new President, Corazon Aquino,
upon taking office immediately took steps to recoup the Marcoses' ille-
gally acquired assets.'"
A. Presidential Commission on Good Government
On February 28, 1986, President Aquino created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to search for, investigate
and return to the Philippine government the funds, moneys, assets and
properties illegally acquired and misappropriated by Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos, their relatives, close business associates, subordinates,
dummies, agents or nominees, whether in the Philippines or abroad.115
Mr. Jovito R. Salonga was appointed chairman.116
In addition, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission was also
alerted. They were alerted once on March 4, 1986, when a large gold
transport from the Philippines was spotted at the Swiss border, and
again on March 21, 1986, when an agent of former President Marcos,
outfitted with a valid power of attorney, attempted to withdraw all of
Marcos's assets from a Zurich bank.117 This last event caused the Fed-
eral Council to issue a provisional freeze on the money Marcos had in
the six banks under the Council's constitutional powers on
March 24, 1986.111 On March 26, the Federal Banking Commission ex-
tended the freeze to all Swiss banks and to all Marcos-related accounts
anywhere in Switzerland. At the same time the PCGG dispatched a
representative to Switzerland and hired lawyers to follow up on the
temporary, though unilateral, 9 freeze by the Swiss authorities.1 20
114. Although a certain level of bribery is tolerated as inevitable in the Philippines, it
was the enormity of it which spearheaded the moral revulsion against an incredibly cor-
rupt regime. See B. ROMULO, INSIDE THE PALACE: THE RISE AND FALL OF FERDINAND &
IMELDA MARcos 255 (1987).
115. Exec. Order No. 1 (Feb. 28, 1986); Exec. Order No. 2 (Mar. 12, 1986); Exec.
Order No. 14 (May 7, 1986).
116. See Exec. Order No. 1 (Feb. 28, 1986).
117. See generally, Frontline, supra note 21.
118. See supra note 23; see also Judgement of July 1, 1987, BGE I, A 156/1987, pt. B,
at 5 (page numbers refer to an English translation available at the Office of N.Y.L. Sch.
J. Int'l & Comp. L.) [hereinafter Zurich Supreme Court Case].
119. The unprecedented freeze caused much concern among Swiss bankers, "who
said they feared it could compromise Switzerland's reputation as a haven of banking
secrecy." Manila Pursuing Assets of Marcos in Switzerland, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1986,
at 19, col. 3. This called for fast action on the part of the Philippine government. Id.
120. Author Hoeta acted as a New York legal consultant for the Philippines, was
instrumental in selecting "three Swiss lawyers from diverse linguistic backgrounds to
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B. The IMAC Request
In the absence of a bilateral agreement with Switzerland, the Phil-
ippines sought help under IMAC. On April 18, 1986, the Embassy of
the Philippines in Berne, under Article 28 of IMAC, applied to the
Federal Police Office for judicial aid. The Philippines requested Swit-
zerland to ascertain, freeze, disclose and return all the assets of Marcos
and his agents. This request came on the strength of the initial request
for assistance by the Solicitor General of the Philippines dated
April 7, 1986. On April 25, 1986, the Philippine Embassy in Berne
supplemented their earlier request with evidence obtained from the
Palace Malacanang12 ' and a memorandum drafted by Swiss lawyers.
These documents provided further evidence establishing the Marcoses'
theft. By April 29, 1986, the Philippine Embassy indicated the inten-
tion of the Philippine government to file criminal and civil actions
against the Marcos group with the Sandiganbayan, a special court for
the trying of public officers and government employees on charges of
corruption and graft.1 22
handle their case," and assisted in administering the Philippines' IMAC request for as-
sistance from the Swiss Federal Police. See supra note 119.
121. In the authors' opinion, many of the documents had already escaped the Mar-
coses' shredding machines.
122. President Marcos created the Sandiganbayan court by Decree No. 1606 in 1973,
as amended by Decree No. 1860 of 1983, pursuant to art. XIII, § 5 of the Philippine
Constitution of 1973. Section 5 states that:
Sec. 5. The National Assembly shall create a special court, to be known as
Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases in-
volving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled cor-
porations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.
PHIL. CONST. of 1973, art. XIII, § 5. On December 24, 1986, by Exec. Order No. 101,
President Corazon Aquino amended this decree further by allowing court sessions to be
held outside the Philippines:
Sec. 2. Official Station: Place of Holding Sessions: The Sandiganbayan shall
have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat
for the trial and determination of all cases filed with it irrespective of the place
where they may have arisen; provided, however, that the Presiding Justice may
authorize any division or divisions of the court to hold sessions and decide cases
at any time and place outside Metro Manila, and where the interest of justice so
requires, outside the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandi-
ganbayan may require the services of personnel and use of the facilities of the
courts or other government offices where any of the divisions is holding session,
and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be subject to the orders of the
Sandiganbayan.
Id. According to art. XIII, § 6 of the Philippine Constitution, only the Tandobayan
(ombudsman) is empowered to bring charges before the Sandiganbayan. PHM. CONST.
art. XIII, § 6.
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The Philippine government also guaranteed reciprocity, noting
that seizure of bank accounts and other assets is authorized under
Philippine law.12 The "dual crimes" listed in the request were bribery,
corruption, graft, theft, embezzlement, fraud, and unlawful abuse of
special authority.'2 4
Subsequently, the Swiss Federal Police in Berne concluded that
the request was complete and that Switzerland's sovereignty, security,
public order or economic interests were not at stake.2  On
April 21, 1986, the Federal Police referred the request to the courts in
those cantons whose banks were suspected of holding the Marcoses'
accounts, that is, Zurich, Geneva, Fribourg, Lucerne and Lausanne.
C. The Proceedings
Following up on the Federal Police's request to decide on the ma-
terial admissibility of the mutual assistance and prior to deciding what
steps would ultimately be taken, the trial judges in the several cantons
all continued the freeze. For example, on April 22, 1986, the investi-
gating judge in Geneva ordered eight Geneva banks to freeze their
Marcos-related assets for immediate seizure and asked the banks for
all information on the accounts so seized."' This order was confirmed
on June 6, 1986.127
Immediately after its institution, an army of attorneys represent-
ing Marcos and other persons whose assets were affected by the freeze
opposed the blocking of the accounts. 128 By letter of October 30, 1986,
123. IMAC, supra note 69, pt. 1, ch. 1, § 3, art. 8(1) ("As a rule, a request shall be
granted only if the requesting State guarantees reciprocity. The Federal Office for Police
Matters of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (Federal Office) may require a
guarantee of reciprocity if this is deemed necessary.").
124. PHIL. PENAL CODE arts. 210-221; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act No. 3019,
Nos. 3-6.
125. IMAC, supra note 69, pt. 1, ch. 1, § 1, art. 1(2) ("In the application of this act,
the sovereignty, security, public order or similar essential interests of Switzerland shall
be taken into account."); Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, pt. C, at 5.
126. Geneva Appellate Case, supra note 105, Statement of Facts, No. 3, at 2.
127. Id., Statement of Facts, No. 6, at 4. The Court in Zurich also issued two orders.
On May 29, 1986, the District Prosecutor's Office ordered all banks in Zurich to block
the Marcoses' accounts and to hand over information and vouchers on those accounts
dating to 1966. On Aug. 5, 1986, the same office stopped inspection of the files by the
Marcoses' group beyond that granted under the Federal Law of 20.3. 1981 concerning
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Legal Assistance Act), Bundesgesetz Ober Inter-
nationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen, SR 351.1, AS 1982, [IRSG] art. 79, para. 3, sen-
tence 2; Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, pt. C, at 6; see also supra note 102.
128. See Judgement of July 1, 1987, BGE I, A 117/1987, A 123/1987, A 125/1987
(BGE I), pt. C, at 5 (page numbers refer to an English translation available at the Office
of N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L.) [hereinafter Geneva Supreme Court Case]; see also
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however, the investigating judge in Geneva informed the Marcoses'
lawyers that he was maintaining the procedure over their objections.
On November 10 and 12, 1986, the Marcos group appealed this order
to the Geneva Chamber of Accusation. Rejecting the appeal on Febru-
ary 4, 1987, the Geneva Chamber of Accusation held that the order to
ascertain and to freeze the Marcos accounts was properly taken.'2 9
Defendants then appealed directly to the Federal Supreme Court.
Raising several procedural and substantive defenses, defendants asked
the Supreme Court to annul the decision and to declare the request
inadmissible or, alternatively, to remand the case for a cantonal ruling
on admissibility.13 0 A similar procedure was followed in the other can-
tons that were holding the Marcoses' frozen assets."3 ' All cases were
heard jointly by the Federal Supreme Court on July 1, 1987.32
No closing orders to inform the Philippine government about the
accounts or to return the assets had been issued by any of the cantons
at the time of the appeal. Thus, the only issue before the Federal Su-
preme Court was the propriety of the orders freezing the assets and
asking for information.
1. Procedural Defenses
Procedurally, defendants argue that they have been denied due
process of law. First, they claim the cantonal courts failed to state suf-
ficient reasons and failed to apprise them of their right to appeal.133
They also claim they have unjustly been denied access to the complete
file.'M Defendants also state the Federal Police Office unduly meddled
with the proceedings and told the Philippine government more than
they should have prior to a closing order.
Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, pt. C, at 6; IMAC, supra note 69, pt. 1, ch.
3, arts. 21(1) and 21(2) ("(1) The person pursued may retain counsel.. .(2) other persons
who are affected by the measure of judicial assistance or who, as injured parties, are
present enquiries .... ").
129. See Geneva Appellate Case, supra note 105. The Appellate Court in Zurich
(Public Prosecutor's Office) rejected the Marcoses' appeals on Feb. 17, 1987. See In Re
Marcos, Judgement of Feb. 17, 1987 (page numbers refer to an English translation avail-
able at the Office of N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L.) [hereinafter Zurich Appellate Court
Case].
130. Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 3(d), at 10.
131. See, e.g., Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, pt. D, at 7.
132. Because the individual claims arose from the same set of facts, the Supreme
Court grouped the several defendants together (Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos,
Roberto S. Benedicto, and Ignacio Gimenez). See Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra
note 128.
133. Id. No. 4, at 11.
134. Id.
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Defendants further criticize the form of the request for mutual as-
sistance. Arguing that under the Philippine Constitution the Ta-
nodbayan (ombudsman) is the proper body to bring cases against gov-
ernment officials before the Sandiganbayan and not the public
prosecutor, they claim the public prosecutor lacks authority to issue an
IMAC request. 5' They also assert that the memorandum by Swiss
counsel should not have been accepted and that the request is there-
fore no more than a fishing expedition.3 "
At the outset, the Federal Supreme Court noted that the proce-
dure was still in its initial stage in both Switzerland and the Philip-
pines. In Switzerland, the cantonal courts had merely decided to go
ahead with the procedure and to seize assets and documents under Ar-
ticle 19 of IMAC. An order closing or terminating the procedure and
authorizing the transmitting of information, documents and assets to
the Philippines under Articles 63 and 74 of IMAC was not in issue
yet.137 In the Philippines, too, criminal investigations leading to pro-
ceedings against Marcos were still only in the beginning stages.
In light of these facts, the court held that whatever the procedural
flaws in the lower proceedings, the defendants were not prejudiced in
their defense. For instance, despite a lack of succinct reasoning by the
lower cantonal court and despite that court's failure to inform the de-
fendants of their right to appeal, defendants did file a timely and
proper appeal."' The court further notes that only those appeals which
challenge a closing order to transmit data or assets to a requesting
state operate as stays; this is not the case with an appeal from a provi-
sional freezing order. 39 Otherwise, a freeze would have little effect.
135. Geneva Appellate Case, supra note 105, pt. III, No. 16, at 23-24; Geneva Su-
preme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 5(a), at 16-17; Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra
note 118, No. 6(b), at 18.
136. Geneva Appellate Case, supra note 105, pt. III, No. 17, at 24-25; Geneva Su-
preme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 5, at 15; Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note
118, No. 4, at 14.
137. Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, No. 2, at 10. The court held:
In the present case the Federal Court has not to judge on the transmission of
information nor on the delivery of objects or assets to the requesting State
within the meaning of Art. 63 and 74 IRSG [IMAC]. The only matter to be
decided here is the question of the fundamental admissibility of the legal aid
applied for and of the provisional measures ordered on the basis of Art. 18 IRSG
[IMAC] [blocking of accounts] and also of the order to take evidence [gathering
of information].
Id.; see also Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 2, at 8.
138. Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 4(a), at 12.
139. IMAC, supra note 69, pt. 1, ch. 3, § 2, art. 21(4) (stating that "the appeal of a
decree which grants extradition or the release of information from the privacy has a
suspensive effect contrary to Article III paragraph 2 of the Act on the Organization of
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The mere filing of an appeal would allow the targeted party to empty
his accounts. This also provided another argument against the defend-
ants' claim that they were prejudiced by the cantonal court's failure to
inform them of their right to appeal. An earlier appeal would not have
lifted the provisional freeze either.4 0
In addition, the court also held the refusal to show all files and
exhibits did not jeopardize the defense. Defendants were given all files
essential to their appeal, and those not given were not mentioned in
any of the decisions. 41 The court did, however, mention that according
to Article 79(3), the defendant may only be denied files when such a
denial is necessary to protect the security of the Confederation or the
cantons. " 2 Thus, defendants may have a right to review more or all
files at a later stage of the proceedings. The court also noted that the
Federal Police Office has supervisory as well as coordinating functions.
The Federal Police Office may, as it has, call meetings of experts to
coordinate the cantonal proceedings. Further, the Police Office has cor-
rectly informed the Philippines of the status of the proceedings, the
claims, and the decisions. It did not disclose the contents of the
accounts.
14 3
The Federal Supreme Court, when commenting on the challenged
form of the request, noted that even though the authority to criminally
charge government officials before the Sandiganbayan in the Philip-
pines rests with the Tanodbayan,'" Article 75(1) of IMAC allows re-
quests for assistance to be made by those competent "to make pro-
nouncements or make decisions."'" This obviously includes, said the
court, the public prosecutor. In addition, not all of those charged were
government officials. Those defendants who were not government offi-
cials would be subject to criminal charges by the public prosecutor in
the regular Philippine courts."4 6
the Federal Administration of Justice.").
140. Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 4(b), at 12-13.
141. Id. No. 4(c), at 14.
142. IMAC, supra note 69, pt. 3, ch. 2, § 1, art. 79(3) ("[A]rticles 6, 26 and 27 of the
Federal Act on Administrative Procedure (SR 172.021) shall be applicable to the exami-
nation of records also in a cantonal proceeding. The entitled person may also examine
the request for assistance and the accompanying documents as far as this is necessary for
the safeguard of his interest .. "); see also Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128,
No. 4(c), at 13-14.
143. Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, No. 4, at 14.
144. PHIL. CONST. art. XIII, § 6.
145. IMAC, supra note 69, pt. 3, ch. 2, § 1, art. 75(1) ("Requests for assistance may
be submitted by authorities which are competent to investigate offences or to render
decisions in other proceedings to which this act is applicable.").
146. Geneva Appellate Case, supra note 105, pt. III, No. 16, at 23-24.
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Also, it is not crucial to an Article 1 IMAC request that a criminal
case actually be pending. 47 All that is required for a valid request is
that it involve a criminal case which may eventually be brought before
a judge.""' The court supported such an argument by Article 11(1) of
IMAC, which includes "any persons suspected" in the definition of
persons pursuable under IMAC.' 4" Thus, the court concluded that the
public prosecutor was entitled to make a preliminary request for assis-
tance against the defendants. 50
The court refuted the defendants' argument on the inadmissibility
of the Swiss lawyers' memorandum. Generally, legal assistance is con-
sidered a basic right and may be denied sparingly. 1" Also the lawyers'
memorandum was "an expression of the opinion of the authorities" of
the Philippines." 2 Further, because the Philippines are not otherwise
represented, the lawyers' presence did not raise defendants' costs.'
The Federal Supreme Court finally rejected defendants' claim that the
request was a mere fishing expedition. According to the court, assis-
tance in unfolding the facts is particularly important in the build-up
phase of a case; therefore, a holding that the state was collecting evi-
dence at random should not be made lightly. 54
2. Substantive Defenses
Defendants raised several substantive defenses, the most impor-
tant of which was the assertion that assistance should be denied since
no criminal prosecution had yet been instituted in the Philippines. In
response, the court first noted that Article 1(2) IMAC requests are in-
deed limited to "criminal matters"'155 and that the PCGG, an adminis-
147. Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, No. 6(b), at 19; Geneva Supreme
Court Case, supra note 128, No. 5(a), at 15-16. For example, the Geneva Supreme Court
noted that an American Securities and Exchange Commission investigation warrants a
request for aid under the Swiss-American Treaty. Id.
148. IMAC, supra note 69, pt. 1, ch. 1, § 1, art. 1 (3) ("This act shall apply only to
criminal matters in which an appeal to a judge can be made according to the law of the
requesting state.").
149. Id. pt. 1, ch. 1, § 1, art. 11 (1) ("A person pursued within the meaning of this act
is any person suspected, under investigation, or affected by a sanction.").
150. Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 5(a), at 15-18.
151. See Geneva Appellate Case, supra note 105, pt. III, No. 17, at 25. (citing in
support the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of Apr. 18, 1961 (RS 0.191.01)).
152. Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, No. 5(a), at 15. The memorandum
was handed in by the Embassy of the Philippines as a supplement to the initial request
of the Solicitor General of Apr. 7, 1986, which was already sufficient in itself.
153. Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 5(b), at 18.
154. Id. No. 5(c), at 18-19.
155. Id. No. 5(a), at 16.
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trative body not authorized to bring criminal charges before the Sandi-
ganbayan or other criminal courts,"' was not within the purview of the
IMAC limitation. The court thus agreed with the defendants that no
criminal case had yet been brought. The court goes on, however, to
hold that an IMAC request and an initial response are proper as long
as they involve future criminal proceedings in the requesting state.
Here the Philippines had stated their intention of bringing Marcos
before the Sandiganbayan on several occasions and the documents left
no doubt that criminal theft was at issue.157 Consequently, the request
as well as the orders to freeze and seize were on solid legal grounds.5 8
The court limited its review, however, to the provisional orders
under Article 18 of IMAC.'" It did not rule on the requirements for
the communicating of information or for the delivering of objects
under Articles 63 and 74 of IMAC. 6O For example, the Geneva Appel-
late Court stated that it did not "prejudge in any way" what should be
done when the time came to transmit information and assets to the
Philippines."'1
Whether actual criminal charges in the Philippines against Marcos
are necessary before Switzerland will disclose the amounts of the ac-
counts and return their contents remains unclear. The Geneva Su-
preme Court did not answer this question explicitly, while the Zurich
Supreme Court clearly stated that the making available of information
would be conditioned on the "actual existence" of criminal
proceedings."'
A further substantive argument for denying the request for assis-
tance was that a fair Marcos trial in the Philippines would not be
forthcoming, as is required by Article 2 of IMAC and by the European
156. Id. No. 5(a), at 17.
157. Id. No. 5(a), at 16-18; Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, No. 6(b), at
19-20.
158. Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 5(a), at 17-18.
159. IMAC, supra note 69, pt. 1, ch. 3, § 1, art. 18 ("Upon express request by another
State, provisional measures may be taken to preserve the existing situation, to safeguard
threatened legal interest or to protect jeopardized evidence if the proceeding according
to this act does not appear obviously inadmissible or inappropriate ... ").
160. Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 2, at 8; Zurich Supreme Court
Case, supra note 118, No. 6(b), at 20.
161. Geneva Appellate Case, supra note 105, pt. IV, No. 22, at 30.
162. Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, No. 6(b), at 20 ("[G]ranting judi-
cial assistance and making available the information obtained would be conditioned by
the actual existence of criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan."). The court
added that "[w]hen transmitting documents to the requesting State it would then be
required (possibly by formulating a corresponding reservation or by obtaining previously
adequate assurances) to make sure that the information obtained may not be used by the
PCGG (cf. Judgement of the Federal Court BGE 109 lb 334/335 C. 15(a))." Id.
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Convention to Safeguard Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties.' a
Marcos claimed that he was not permitted to return to the Philippines,
and even if he could go, a free choice of defense counsel would be de-
nied to him. He claimed that the Sandiganbayan was not an impartial
court since it was subject to the new President, who had already re-
placed several of the justices.' The court responded that an "objec-
tive and serious risk of a tainted procedure" in the sense of Article 2 of
IMAC had not been demonstrated,16 5 and further, this issue did not
have to be decided before a final closing order could be issued to trans-
mit data and assets to the Philippines."'6 When and if that time came,
the court could require guarantees to protect the Marcoses' human
rights.1 67
Marcos finally pleaded governmental immunity. Here the court re-
plied that such immunity applies only to the acts of acting chiefs of
state and not to private acts. 66 The court added that the immunity
defense can only properly be raised before a Philippine court which
decided the case on its merits.'6 9 The Swiss mutual assistance proceed-
ings are merely accessory to a foreign legal process. 70
IX. CONCLUSION
Switzerland has clearly shown its willingness to aid the Philippines
in the recovery of the Marcos millions hidden in Swiss bank accounts.
Generally, such a recovery process passes through several stages. In the
initial stage, the accounts are frozen while the Swiss authorities inter-
nally explore their contents. In the next stage, data concerning the ac-
counts are transmitted to the requesting state. In the last stage, Swit-
zerland returns the money. Thus far, the Marcos accounts have been
frozen since March 25, 1986, when the Swiss Council unilaterally-an
163.' Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 6, at 19 (citing the European
Convention to Safeguard Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties, Nov. 4, 1950); Zu-
rich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, No. 7(a), at 21.
164. Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 6, at 20; Zurich Supreme
Court Case, supra note 118, No. 7(b), at 22.
165. Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 6, at 21.
166. Id. The Geneva Appellate Court added to this point that Switzerland should
avoid through "over-scrupulousness allowing an ill-gotten fortune" to remain in Marcos
and his family possessions, simply because he had acted during his public office. Geneva
Appellate Court Case, supra note 105, pt. IV, No. 26, at 34. See also Zurich Supreme
Court Case, supra note 118, No. 7(b), at 23-24.
167. Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, No. 7(b), at 24.
168. Geneva Supreme Court Case, supra note 128, No. 7, at 21-22.
169. Id. No. 7, at 22.
170. Zurich Supreme Court Case, supra note 118, No. 8, at 24-25.
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act unheard of before-ordered the freeze. Since then, the freeze has
been confirmed by the respective cantonal courts and the Federal Su-
preme Court following the official request for assistance by the Philip-
pines on April 7, 1986. Meanwhile, the banks involved have notified
the Swiss authorities of the contents of the frozen accounts. In the
wake of the Supreme Court decision of July 1, 1987, the Philippines
have filed a civil case before the Sandiganbayan in July, 1987.171
Presently at stake is the transmission of the data to the Philip-
pines and the return of the money. Here the parties face a new round
of litigation before the cantonal and federal courts. A first problem is
the necessity of bringing criminal charges against Marcos. Swiss for-
eign judicial assistance appears to be limited to "criminal" matters,
and presently, the PCGG is merely an administrative body, unautho-
rized to bring criminal cases. In addition, the question remains
whether the Philippines will be able to bring such a claim before the
Sandiganbayan or their regular criminal courts.
The country is still in turmoil, which can be expected after twenty
years of Marcos' presidency, mismanagement and dictatorship. 72 How-
ever, the recently completed election of more than 16,000 local officials
throughout the country is a hallmark that the days of the dictatorship
are fading and that a truly viable democracy as envisioned by the late
President Aquino is emerging from the chaos. Also, with respect to
Marcos's lawyers' argument that it is questionable whether their client
can expect a fair trial in the Philippines, the Court of Appeals of Zu-
rich has indicated loudly and clearly that a fair criminal proceeding by
the present independent judiciary should be possible.
One thing all Philippine factions agree on is that "Marcos raped
the Nation.' ' 7 3 On the Swiss side, the feeling exists that justice should
not be obstructed because of technical difficulties.
Solutions have been offered. The Philippines could perhaps be-
stow the PCGG with criminal powers, or Marcos could be tried in ab-
sentia like the accused in the Nuremberg Trials of 1946 (a principle of
penal procedure recognized and accepted in Switzerland as it is in most
European countries). 74 The court of Appeals of Zurich has said "a fair
criminal proceeding should be possible, even when the accused is not
171. See Aquino Needs a New Miracle, FORTUNE, Sept. 14, 1987, at 90.
172. See generally Praying for Time: As Intrigue and Chaos Grow, Can Cory Be
Saved? TIME, Nov. 23, 1987 at 36; Manila's Mood: As Terrorism Spreads in Philippines,
Mrs. Aquino's Presidency Seems to Be in Jeopardy, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1987, at 1, 21,
col. 1; President Aquino Risks Frittering Away Philippine Democracy, Wall St. J., Sept.
28, 1987, at 33, col. 1.
173. Aquino Needs a New Miracle, supra note 171, at 90.
174. N. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TIAL, at 477 (1953).
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present" and "judicial assistance cannot be denied until the accused
can return to the Philippines; the criminal proceedings can also take
place without them."175
Finally, the Sandiganbayan could perhaps arraign and indict
Marcos outside the boundaries of the Philippines. According to a re-
cent presidential decree, the Sandiganbayan may hold sessions outside
the Philippines if the interests of justice so require. 76 In fact, such a
session could be held in the United States, provided such a procedure
met with the approval of the United States Government.
The Marcos case remains viable. Hope exists that the Philippines
will criminally charge Marcos somehow, somewhere, and that the Swiss
courts will, as long as Marcos is guaranteed a fair trial, accept a flexible
and broad interpretation of the Philippine penal procedures. The Swiss
bank accounts belong neither to Marcos nor to Switzerland; they be-
long to the Filipino people who should regain that which is rightfully
theirs.
175. Zurich Appellate Court Case, supra note 129, at 23.
176. Exec. Order No. 101 (Dec. 24, 1986).
1988]

